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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate cross-country differences in wage mobility in Europe 
using the European Community Household Panel. The paper is particularly focused 
on examining the impact of economic conditions, welfare state regimes and 
employment regulation on wage mobility. We apply a log-linear approach that is very 
much similar to a restricted multinomial logit model and much more flexible than the 
standard probit approach. It appears that regime, economic conditions and 
employment regulation explain a substantial part of the cross-country variation. The 
findings also confirm the existence of an inverse U-shape pattern of wage mobility, 
showing a great deal of low and high-wage persistence in all countries. 
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1.  Reviewing the measures of income and wage mobility 
 
Different responses are to be expected when individuals are asked what changes in 
wages or incomes they would like to experience over time: some people would just 
wish to see their income rise in absolute levels (absolute mobility); another group 
would like to see its income improved compared to other people (relative mobility); 
others prefer their income to be stable and not to be too volatile (income risk). 
Following these differences in individual preferences, numerous definitions of wage 
mobility have been developed.  These definitions correspond to different theories 
about the way income or wage changes affects the well-being of individuals (Fritzell, 
1990). 
According to standard economic theory, people are assumed to be primarily 
interested in the absolute changes of their (real) income. However, Hirsch (1995) 
suggested that even if someone cared only for the purchasing power of his own 
income, his rank in the distribution still matters, as it determines his ability to acquire 
“positional” (goods whose assigned value depends on how many other possess them) 
or status goods. Hence, the relative position of an individual in the distribution, 
referred to as ‘relative positional’ mobility, matters more. Other researchers, such as 
Duesenberry (1967) and Easterlin (1974) believe also that since preferences are 
endogenous, people tend to adapt them in view of what others have and want (the 
“keeping up” with the Joneses’ aspect). The idea of “relative deprivation”, according 
to which people always evaluate their income or living conditions in comparison to 
the conditions of their peers, was introduced by sociologists such as Runciman 
(1966). This theory suggests that an individual considers him or herself successful if   3
his(her) income remains stable while the income of the individuals (s)he compares 
him or herself with deteriorates. Psychologists such as Brickman et al. (1978), 
however, argue that individual income gains tend to diminish due to the rapid 
adjustment of  people’s preferences to the new situation and due to raising their 
expectations about the future. Therefore, they suggest that no gain in happiness or 
social welfare will occur in the end. 
Most studies on wage mobility involve measures that include all the three 
aforementioned sorts of mobility (absolute mobility, relative mobility and income 
risk). Nevertheless, in many studies it is not always clear why these measures are 
selected (Headey and Muffels, 2003). As we want to compare wage mobility at the 
macro or country level, we have transformed these measures of individual mobility 
into measures of overall mobility in the society. At the aggregate level, absolute 
individual mobility translates into economic growth; relative individual mobility into 
income inequality or income dispersion, and income risk into income stability or 
income security. Fields (2000),  dealing  with macro-level mobility, argues that 
changes in the overall wage distribution might change the ranking of the individual in 
the distribution without changing his absolute level of income. In metaphorical terms, 
this is the question of what matters more: “changing rooms or rooms changing” 
addressed by Fields (2000) and Van Kerm (2001). The type of rank mobility, where 
individuals exchange their income positions while total income and overall income 
dispersion remain the same, is known as “exchange” mobility. “Exchange” mobility 
has to be distinguished from “structural” mobility that refers to the growth in absolute 
income of all people or to the mobility emerging from the increase in the income 
dispersion (Markandya, 1982; Markandya, 1982; Markandya, 1984; Fields and Ok, 
1999). Yet, we can decompose this structural component of aggregate mobility, as in   4
the individual case, in a growth component (equal changes in the income of all 
people) and a dispersion or inequality component (a change in the dispersion without 
a change in the aggregate income of all people, Van Kerm, 2001).  
 
2.  Which mobility measure is most appropriate for the issue under study 
 
The question now is what sort of mobility measure is most appropriate for the issue 
under study. This paper investigates the role of macro-economic conditions, regime 
type and labour market institutions in explaining cross-country differences in wage 
mobility. These labour market institutions are shaped according to policies whose aim 
is to raise the growth component and to reduce the dispersion and risk component of 
wage mobility in a country. For this reason, relative positional mobility, which is 
defined as the year-to-year change in the decile ranking, is chosen as our mobility 
measure. The advantage of the measure is that it really takes into account all three 
sorts of mobility components explained above: absolute (growth), relative (dispersion) 
and exchange mobility, although we cannot disentangle them. This can be shown with 
the following example: 
Consider the case of a group of four people having wages in year 1 equal to 
2,000, 3,500, 4,500 and 5,000 euros, respectively. Suppose that in year 2, the 
individual that ranks originally highest in the wage distribution, has still a wage of 
5,000 euros in year 2, but the secondly, thirdly and fourthly ranked individual in the 
original distribution, have now wages of 6,900, 7,100 and 8,000 euros, respectively. 
Thus, the highest ranked individual in year 1 has now lowest rank in the wage 
distribution of year 2. In this example we could decompose the mobility into a 
growth, dispersion and exchange component in the following way.    5
 
  Year 1            Year 2   
Initial 
ranking 
 Growth  Dispersion  Exchange   
Final  
ranking 
1 2,000   5,000    5,000   8,000 4 
2 3,500   6,500    6,900   6,900 2 
3 4,500   7,500    7,100   7,100 3 
4 5,000   8,000    8,000   5,000 1 
 
 
 
The growth component is the equal absolute change in income with 3,000 euros for all 
people. The dispersion component results from a transfer of 400 euros from individual 
3 to individual 2 and the exchange component is just an exchange of rank between 
individual 4 and 1 without a change in the aggregate income.   
The inability to decompose mobility into a growth, dispersion or exchange 
component has likely to do with the fact that we only observe the rank change but not 
how it emanates from changes in the underlying components. Moreover, since we 
only measure rank changes, we cannot examine whether there is more upward or 
more downward mobility in a particular country. For the same reason, our measure of 
relative positional wage mobility renders little information about whether an increase 
in it leads to an increase or decrease of levels of wage inequality. It informs us, 
however, about the extent, at least in relative terms, of wage risk and wage volatility 
people experience and hence, about the overall level of wage stability. The more 
wages fluctuate over time the more equal they become in the medium and long-term.   6
High rates of immobility therefore, signal a high persistence of wage inequality levels 
over time. 
 
Our measure of positional mobility 
Our aggregate positional mobility measure is based on the year-to-year transitions of 
working individuals across deciles of the wage distribution within each country
1. Our 
aim is particularly to explain the  10 10×  table (Table 1), where cells represent 
frequencies. The index for the rows denotes the decile position in year 1, while the 
index for the columns represents the decile position in year 2. In a society with perfect 
mobility (PM) all cells per row have the same value (
10
10
1
,
,
∑
= =
j
j i
k i
x
x , for each 
10 ,..., 1 = k ), while in a perfectly immobile society (PI) all off-diagonal elements of 
the table are zero ( 0 = ij x , if  j i ≠ ). In our analysis, individuals whose destination 
state differs up to one decile from the origin state are considered immobile, because a 
transition of one decile could be the result of a light level of churning in the wage 
distribution (see Table 1). 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Outline of the paper 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 the literature on the subject is 
reviewed and some hypotheses about the dissimilarities in wage mobility patterns 
                                                  
1 In order to test for the sensitivity of our analysis with respect to the clustering of incomes in deciles 
we repeated our analysis by clustering incomes in 20 categories. Results showed that country 
differences did not change.    7
across countries and welfare regimes are formulated. In section 4 the data and 
sampling from the European Community Household Panel is discussed. Section 5 
begins with commenting on the results of the estimation of the standard probit 
regression. Further on, section 5 presents the results of the log-linear based restricted 
multinomial logit model, which are compared to the probit regression outcomes. Two 
models are estimated; the first one with country and another with regime type along 
with selected macro-economic and institutional indicators. The models are evaluated 
by comparing the parameter estimates, the fit indices and the explanatory power. 
Finally, the business cycle and time effects are investigated with respect to their 
contribution in explaining the observed country and regime type differences. The 
main conclusions of the study as well as the issues for further research are discussed 
in the last section of the paper. 
 
3.  Theory and research on wage mobility patterns across countries: hypotheses  
 
Literature on wage mobility is rather poor compared to the amount of studies on 
income mobility. Furthermore, studies on wage dynamics focus more on the issues of 
wage growth, wage inequality and the volatility of wages over time rather than on 
wage mobility as such. From a policy point of view, this is not surprising as 
politicians are generally more concerned with fostering economic growth, reducing 
inequality and increasing stability and security than with increasing wage mobility per 
se. However, wage mobility seems to become a more important issue in both 
economics and policy making.  Politicians confronted with a sluggish labour market 
seem to become aware of the fact that promoting mobility on the labour market   8
contributes to a more competitive and efficiently operating labour market, which may 
in turn raise productivity levels and therewith growth. (Table 2). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
  
Apart from wage mobility, wage dispersion should be also investigated, as except for 
the northern European countries, evidence to date suggests that from the mid 1980s 
until the mid 1990s wage inequality has risen steadily, although at a different level, in 
many Western countries. Specifically, from the mid 1980s on, wage inequality has 
showed a diverse pattern; it increased strongly in the UK and in Portugal (Cardoso, 
1998; 2004), but showed moderate increases in continental countries and no increases 
or even decreases in Scandinavian countries (Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998; Aaberge, 
2002; Acemoglu, 2003).  
There are three leading theories for the explanation of these changes in the 
wage patterns: the increased international trade and increased migration suggesting 
that non-sheltered sectors in the US and in Europe face increased international 
competition by less developed (low wage) countries, which has an adverse 
downsizing effect on the wages of the low-skilled workers in these sectors (Borjas and 
Ramey, 1995) ; the rapid skill-biased technological change, which explains the 
increase in the dispersion of wages by the introduction and rapid spread of new 
technologies and the resulting increase in the demand of high skilled workers at the 
expense of their low skilled peers (Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu, 2003); the process of 
deregulation or removal of labour market regulations and institutions that allows 
wages to adjust more adequately and rapidly to market changes. This process of 
deregulation permits labour markets to become more flexible and to respond more   9
swiftly to ongoing changes. The tendency in policy to promote flexibilisation by 
removing institutional barriers to mobility is contented to account for the differences 
in both the trends and the levels of wage inequality between the US, the UK and the 
continental European countries (Blau and Kahn, 1996).  
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) argue that much of the change in earnings 
inequality occurred at the bottom of the distribution due to the sharp increase of the 
skill premium for the better skilled.  As Acemoglu (2002; 2003) has argued, the skill 
premium happened to be much larger in the US than in Europe, because in Europe 
supply responded more swiftly to the demand shifts caused by the process of skill-
biased technological change than in the US. Lee (1999) suggests that the erosion of 
the minimum wage levels might account for the increase in wage inequality. It is 
apparent, however, that this variety of causes is hardly examined in empirical 
research, probably due to the lack of datasets and yardsticks to measure these complex 
processes.  
Dominant perspectives in economic theory argue that the ongoing changes in 
the economy and in the labour market have resulted in a higher level of wage mobility 
over time that has dampened the short-term shocks in wage inequality. Although 
individuals are less income secure in the medium and long-term than they were in the 
past as wages are more volatile, workers also possess more opportunities for moving 
into a better-paid job. Ultimately, it is an empirical question how overall wage 
mobility, in terms of wage growth and wage dispersion, is balanced against less 
income security and stability. Nevertheless, whatever the balance is, there will be 
winners and losers in this process dependent on the demand and supply relationships, 
the level of their skills and their earnings capacities.    10
Recent studies show that increases in wage inequality are indeed not the result 
of short-term shocks in the wage distribution. Dickens (2000) concludes that they 
reflect a long-term increase in the wage disparities across individuals. He finds 
evidence of high and increasing (since the 1970s) levels of immobility, especially 
among the low-paid, in the UK. Burkhauser et al. (1997) conducted a comparative 
study of earnings mobility in the US and Germany in the 1980s. Although, the welfare 
systems and the labour markets of the two countries differ significantly, they find “a 
great deal of persistence” and a similar pattern of mobility in these two countries. 
Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) reached the same conclusion for the US, the country with 
the most liberal labour market. Cappellari (2002), using panel data from the Survey on 
Households Income and Wealth of the Bank of Italy, finds high levels of immobility 
among the low paid Italian workers. Buchinsky et al. (1998) corroborate these results 
for the French workers.  
 
Comparative research 
It is apparent that the literature concerning wage mobility patterns lacks a sufficient 
amount of cross-country comparative studies. In the 1990s, much of the comparative 
research in Europe was based on the LIS (Luxembourg Income Study) – a dataset that 
contains data for various countries. This dataset includes data for different time 
periods per country, although within the 1980s and the 1990s. The main disadvantage 
of LIS is that it consisted of repeated cross-section data rather than panel data. As 
researchers had no panel data – at least not for the majority of the countries – they 
needed to restrict their analyses to one component of wage mobility only, i.e. wage or 
earnings inequality. Later on, although panel data became available for a longer 
period of time, they covered a few countries only, namely the Netherlands, Germany   11
and the UK
2. Finally, with the establishment of the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) a new and rich panel data source became available, covering 15 
member states of the European Union. Despite of the fact that the ECHP started only 
in 1994 and covered a relatively short period of eight years, up to 2001, we make use 
this dataset as it covers a larger number of countries than any other longitudinal 
dataset. For this reason, it is a much more powerful tool for examining the impact of 
different institutional settings on wage mobility than any hitherto available.  
 
The role of institutional constraints 
There is a growing literature suggesting that labour market institutions and 
employment protection regulations account for the dissimilar mobility patterns in the 
labour market of different countries. Even when the institutions do not seem to differ 
considerably across countries, the dissimilarities emerge more outspokenly across 
particular clusters of countries. Countries with a more flexible labour market due to 
relatively low levels of employment regulation, such as the UK and Ireland, are 
believed to exhibit much more job and wage mobility than strongly regulated 
countries such as the Southern European countries, namely Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain.  This classification of countries according to the level of regulation seems to 
coincide remarkably well with Esping-Andersen’s regime type classification (1990) 
that was based on his socio-political account of welfare state policies during the 1960s 
and 1970s and the degree of de-commodification (the level of public interference) by 
which these policies set themselves apart from each other. Translated into the labour 
                                                  
2 Apart from these long-running national panels, some more national datasets, such as  the Luxembourg 
(PSELL) and Belgium panel (PBSH), were developed since the mid and late 1980s, but they were 
hardly used for research on income mobility.     12
market this de-commodification notion concerns the degree to which the labour 
market is governed by laws, regulations (minimum pay, employment protection 
regulations, collective wage bargaining, union density etc.) and public interventions 
preventing the labour market from operating as a free market.  Therefore, we will 
examine to what extent the level of regulation contributes to explaining the cross-
country differences in wage mobility in Europe. In the employment report of (2003), 
the European Commission  already pointed out that the wage distributions of EU 
member states seem to vary considerably due to differences that prevail among them 
with respect to different kinds and levels of employment protection. 
More concisely, we contend that countries characterized by a low public 
interference and loose levels of employment protection legislation, denoted as liberal 
regimes by Esping-Andersen, are likely to attain higher levels of job and wage 
mobility. Southern European countries are believed to exhibit low levels of wage 
mobility due to the strictness of their employment protection legislation and despite 
the low union density. The segmented labour market of Southern European countries 
safeguards primarily the position of workers in the internal labour market. Likewise, 
low levels of wage mobility are expected in the continental European countries due to 
their strongly regulated labour market, high union density and strict compliance with 
collective wage bargaining. In Scandinavian regimes, notwithstanding the high union 
density and the high level of compliance with collective wage bargaining, wages seem 
to be more flexible than in the strongly regulated continental countries, although still 
less flexible than the lowly-regulated labour markets of the liberal countries (Muffels 
and Fouarge, 2002; Muffels and Luijkx, 2004).  
Furthermore, we contend that in countries with high levels of minimum wages 
affecting a large share of the working population, such as in France, low levels of   13
wage mobility will be observed in the lower part of the wage distribution. On the 
contrary, in countries with no or low levels of minimum wages, such as in the UK, we 
expect higher levels of wage mobility at the lower ends of the distribution.  
There are various ways to study the impact of institutional constraints; one is 
to use the “regime type” approach and to examine the role of ”country clusters” in 
explaining wage mobility patterns. Another is to start from the institutions and 
regulations themselves and to examine to what extent they might have a bearing on 
the observed mobility patterns. In the second approach, the effects of institutional 
differences in terms of minimum wages, employment protection regulations, union 
density, contract compliance and the wage bargain on wage mobility patterns are 
observed. In this paper we also use the EPL-index as constructed by the OECD, which 
is a direct measure for the strictness of employment protection regulation in a 
country
3.  We would have preferred to include separate measures for minimum wage 
levels, union density and contract compliance at the industrial sector level, had we 
reliable sources to do so.  
 
 
                                                  
3 The OECD (2004) developed an index to measure the strictness of the Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) in the various countries based on criteria concerning legislation on regular 
employment, temporary employment and collective dismissal’. However, the OECD itself raised 
doubts about the validity of the index because labour markets might react markedly different to the 
introduction of similar policy measures and legislation. For example, the relaxation of restrictions 
concerning fixed term employment in Spain and in Germany in the 1980s had rather dissimilar effects 
on the labour markets in these two countries. The index does not also take into account the important 
role of the informal sector in Southern Europe operating as a buffer against income losses due to 
involuntary unemployment and therefore affects wage mobility patterns.   14
Macro-economic conditions and time 
A further aim of our paper is to scrutinize the extent by which wage mobility is 
affected by the business cycle. Therefore, we control for differences in the stage of the 
business cycle across countries. To do that efficiently, we included several indicators 
such as the unemployment rate, the yearly change of GDP per capita and the labour 
force participation rate for males aged 16-64 (Table 3).  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Although we use it as an indicator for the level of wage regulation in a country and for 
the extent that this regulation affects mobility patterns, “regime type” is still not a 
static concept. The classification of a country to a specific regime type might change, 
as wage regulations enacted through policies might shift over time. Due to these 
changes in policies and to the response of labour markets to them, regimes tend to 
converge or diverge over time. Therefore, it is important to study the evolution of 
cross-country differences over time.  
 
Job and employment characteristics 
A third topic covered in the paper is to what extent prevailing cross-country 
differences in wage mobility are associated with differences in the job and 
employment structure. Workers in the public sector face usually lower job turnover 
rates and experience relatively smaller wage changes, either upward or downward, 
than private sector workers. The more workers are employed in the public sector the 
lower wage mobility tends to be in a country. Workers with higher skills and 
educational qualifications experience usually a steeper career with faster wage   15
growth. In contrast, low educated workers are usually employed in low skilled jobs 
with little opportunities to improve their wage prospects. Therefore, the more the 
distribution of education and the reward to skills differ across countries the more the 
wage mobility patterns tend to diverge.  
 
4.  Data, main concepts and descriptive analysis 
 
We use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which has been designed 
by EUROSTAT for income study purposes. It is a longitudinal database that contains 
comparable socio-economic data for individuals and households from 15 European 
countries for eight years, namely from 1994 to 2001. It includes information for 
approximately 60,000 households and 130,000 individuals per wave (EUROSTAT, 
2001). ECHP data were collected by the “National Collection Data Units” according 
to a centrally designed questionnaire. However, some countries (Austria and Finland) 
lack data for the first or for the first two waves, as they stepped in later. Due to 
artifacts in the income data we excluded Belgium and Luxembourg. Sweden was also 
excluded, as the ECHP database includes repeated cross-section rather than panel data 
for this country. The first wave of ECHP (1994) was excluded from our analysis as, in 
the view of EUROSTAT, the income data for the first wave (1994) are much less 
robust than the data for the consecutive waves, also due to learning effects in dealing 
with longitudinal data sources. Hence, our sample consists of 7 waves and 12 
countries. 
The sample is restricted to male wage earners between 25 and 55 years old, 
appearing in the dataset for at least two subsequent years and declaring paid 
employment as their main economic activity for the year prior to the survey. The main   16
reason for restricting our analysis to male employees is that females tend to have more 
career breaks and more intermittent periods of temporary or permanent lay-off for 
very different reasons than males (e.g. caring obligations). Thus, we cannot include 
women in our analysis without controlling for the factors responsible for their 
different career paths, which goes beyond the scope of this paper. We excluded men 
younger than 25 years because most of them are in some kind of education. Men older 
that 54 years are also excluded from the sample as they often participate in early 
retirement schemes or reduce voluntarily working hours. Furthermore, due to our 
focus on wage earners we excluded the self-employed and the unemployed.   Finally, 
in order to eliminate measurement error, individuals with extremely high and 
extremely low wage incomes were excluded from our sample
4.  
Our basic unit of analysis is the working individual in the household and our 
main economic variable is total income from employment. This is the total personal 
net labour income after deduction of taxes and social contributions, with the reference 
year being the year prior to the survey. In order to construct our sample, we rank the 
wage income of individuals according to their decile position within a country and we 
examine the transitions between decile positions in year t and t+1. Our sample 
population consists of 12,709 individuals for the first pair of years (1995-1996), 
13,746 for the second (1996-1997), 13,193 for the third (1997-1998), 15,379 for the 
fourth (1998-1999), 14,533 for the fifth (1999-2000) and 14,173 for the last (2000-
2001)
5.  
                                                  
4 Specifically, we excluded individuals having less than 10% and more than 3,000% of the median 
wage income. 
5 From now on the time points of our analysis will correspond to the year from which the data come 
from. For example when we refer to time point 1998-1999 data come from wave 7 (1999-2000) of the 
ECHP.   17
 
Descriptive analysis 
A rough overview of the decile transitions workers experience can be observed 
in Table 4. This table presents origin-destination transitions pooled across countries 
and time periods. Observations seem to be concentrated along the main diagonal 
especially at the corners of the table. As we move away from the diagonal, 
frequencies become significantly lower. Therefore, the main finding of this table is 
the significant amount of persistence, especially at the low and high wage strata. Low- 
and high-wage earners seem to be experiencing hardly any wage change in a one-year 
period.  
The relevant tables by welfare regime (Tables 4a-4d) reveal some interesting 
differences. Contrary to our expectations, wage earners in the Nordic countries 
(including the Netherlands) are apparently more mobile than average, while workers 
from the lowly regulated (liberal) countries, are seemingly less mobile than average. 
In the Southern welfare regimes immobility rates appear lower than average at least in 
the higher income strata. 
 
[Insert Table 4 and Tables 4a-4d about here] 
 
The data that we use in our analysis consists of a separate observed transition table per 
country (12 countries), time (6 time points: 1994-1995 up to 1999-2000), sector (2 
sectors: private and public), and education (3 groups: lower than high school, high 
school and higher education) combination. As information on two countries is missing 
for the first time point and on one country for the second time point, we have in total 
414 (instead of 432) transition tables. It should be noted that for the construction of   18
these transition matrices, deciles were defined per country and time period 
combination, which means that same definition applies across education and sector 
groups (within country-time combinations). 
 
5.  Models for explaining wage mobility patterns according to the transition 
matrices  
 
A simple probit analysis  
The method for analyzing the 414 10-by-10 transition tables needs to allow the 
detection of differences in relative positional wage mobility patterns across a large 
number of tables. The method should therefore be able to detect differences across 
countries (or regimes), time points, education groups and employment sectors in the 
tendency of individuals to move more than one decile in the wage distribution. Below 
we present a log-linear variant of the multinomial logit regression model that can be 
used for this purpose, but first we perform a simpler analysis, using a standard probit 
regression model that can serve as a benchmark for the other models. The 
dichotomous outcome variable indicates whether a change of more than one decile 
occurred or not. Country, time, time-country interaction, education and sector are used 
as categorical predictors in this probit regression.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Rather than reporting all the details about the obtained parameter estimates, 
we summarize the main results in Table 5 as represented by the estimated average 
probability (the marginal effects) of moving more than one decile for each of the   19
combinations of country and time period. As can be seen, the highest probability of 
changing more than one decile in the wage distribution is found initially for Denmark, 
Italy and Greece, while the lowest rates are found for Portugal and France. Within the 
period of reference, however, the rank of countries changes: at the end of this period, 
Denmark, Ireland and Spain rank first while Portugal, France and Germany come last. 
By summing up the results with respect to welfare regimes, we observe that in 
southern European countries individuals face high (with the exception of Portugal) 
and decreasing (with the exception of Spain) levels of wage mobility. Nordic 
countries present either high (Denmark) or initially low but strongly increasing (the 
Netherlands and Finland) rates of wage mobility. Estimates for countries of the 
continental regime are situated somewhere in the middle (except for France that ranks 
lower) but they are uniformly decreasing. For the lowly regulated labour markets of 
the UK and Ireland we get contradicting results as Ireland has very high levels of 
wage mobility, while the UK has unexpectedly significantly lower levels. In both 
countries however, the probability of changing more than one decile does not change 
significantly during the reference period. 
 
A restricted multinomial logit analysis 
A limitation of this rather simple probit regression analysis is that all types of 
transitions are pooled; that is, it does account neither for the origin state from which a 
transition takes place, nor for the size or the direction of a transition. The analysis 
could be refined by doing a separate analysis per origin state and per direction of the 
move, and by taking into account the size of the move, for example, by means of an 
ordered probit model. This would, however, require many separate regressions. For 
this reason, we opt for a method that can account for all these aspects in a single   20
analysis. This method includes the application of a variant of the multinomial logit 
model that makes use of log-bilinear restrictions from the log-linear analysis field. 
We specify a multinomial logit model for the probability that an individual is 
in a particular destination (D) state (decile) given his origin (O) state (his state in the 
previous year) and the subgroup (G ) to which he belongs. This probability will be 
denoted by  () g G o O d D P = = = , | . With the term subgroup we mean one of the 
aforementioned 414 time, country, education, and sector combinations. The basic 
structure of the multinomial logit model we use is  
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This model contains two types of regression parameters: 
G D
g d
|
| β  and 
G OD
g od
|
| β . The 
term 
G D
g d
|
| β  is an intercept term for the destination state D=d that may differ across 
subgroups. The other parameter - 
G OD
g od
|
| β - captures the strength of the origin-
destination association that may also differ across subgroups. In our application, the 
term of main interest is this origin-destination association term. This size of this term 
indicates the amount of mobility (the smaller the association between the origin and 
destination state, the more mobility). What we are especially interested in is how 
much the size of this term varies across subgroups defined by country, time, sector, 
and education. However, if we would not further restrict the 
G OD
g od
|
| β  term, we would 
have to estimate and interpret 81 (=9*9) association parameters for each of the 414 
tables, which is, of course, not meaningful. For such situations, where there is a large 
number of association parameters (here 81) that vary across large numbers of 
subgroups (here 414), in the log-linear modeling field, restrictions have been proposed   21
for specifying parsimonious higher-order interaction terms. These methods involving 
the use of bilinear decompositions have been applied among others in the analysis of 
mobility tables (Hout, 1983; Luijkx, 1994; Vermunt, 1997; Goodman and Hout, 1998; 
Goodman and Hout, 2001). In our case, the following bilinear decomposition is 
used:
G
g
OD
od
OD
od
G OD
g od b a φ β ⋅ + =
|
| .  This decomposition implies that the various tables have 
a common component 
OD
od a , which serves as a kind of intercept or overall mean 
association term. The other component 
G
g
OD
od b φ ⋅ captures the differences in the origin-
destination associations across tables, where the parameters 
OD
od b  can be regarded as 
“slopes” of the explanatory variables’ effects; they indicate in which parts of the 
mobility table the largest differences across subgroups occur. The term 
G
g φ   is a 
scaling factor indicating whether mobility is higher or lower than average in a 
particular subgroup.  In other words, differences in mobility across tables are 
described by a single coefficient per table. For reasons of normalization, we have to 
impose a location and a scaling restriction on the 
G
g φ  parameters. Here, we will use 
0 = ∑
g
G
g φ  and  ( ) 1
2
= ∑
g
G
g φ , which implies that the 
G
g φ  parameters are centered and 
restricted to have a sum of squares of 1. For our analysis, we made use of the program 
LEM (Vermunt, 1997). 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 illustrates the values of the log-likelihood function and the BIC 
obtained by the various models that were estimated. The first two models serve as 
baseline models. In Model 0, both the 
OD
od a  and 
OD
od b  terms are restricted to be equal to   22
zero, which yields a model in which the destination state is assumed to be independent 
of the origin state. Model 1 assumes that 
OD
od b  is equal to zero for each o-d 
combination, yielding a homogeneous association model. Comparison of the log-
likelihood and BIC values of Models 0 and 1 shows that the origin and destination 
states of individuals in the wage distribution are strongly correlated. Model 2, in 
which we use the bilinear decomposition described above, fits much better than 
Model 1 in terms of the log-likelihood, indicating that the origin-destination 
association is not equal across tables. In Models 3 to 6, we use several simplifying 
assumptions for the term 
OD
od b . Among these models, the model that fits best 
according to the BIC criterion, Model 4, contains only nonzero 
OD
od b  parameters for 
the main diagonal and the first subdiagonals, while the subdiagonal parameters are 
also restricted to be symmetric (equal for upward and downward moves across the 
two same states). This model does not only present the best fit to the data according to 
the statistical indices, but it is also straightforward in its interpretation; Model 4 
captures country differences in immobility (i.e., in the probability of changing at most 
one decile), which makes the results somewhat comparable with the results obtained 
by the probit regression. The added value of the multinomial logit analysis is its 
ability to discern cross-country differences in various parts of the wage distribution. 
Nevertheless, Models 2-6 fit worse than the homogeneous model (Model 2) in 
terms of the BIC. This is probably due to the large number of parameters included in 
these models. Therefore, a more parsimonious version of Model 4 (Model 4a) was 
employed in which insignificant predictor effects have been omitted
6. Model 4a fits 
much better than the homogeneous model in terms of log-likelihood and BIC values. 
                                                  
6 The significance of the effects of model 4 is discussed later on in this section.    23
Findings for model 4a seem to establish the existence of differences in origin-
destination association between tables defined by the predictors. 
  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Results of the multinomial logit regression 
Table 7 reports the overall association terms – in their multiplicative form  ) exp(
OD
od a  – 
as obtained with Model 4. The numbers indicate how much more likely the 
“transition” concerned is compared to the perfect mobility situation. Perfect mobility 
is defined as the situation in which the origin and destination states are independent of 
one another. As can easily be seen, observations tend to be concentrated along the 
main diagonals, indicating large immobility. Moreover, even if the huge parameter 
estimates for cells (1,1) and (10,10), which may be the result of ceiling effects, are 
ignored, the bottom right and the upper left part of the table still contain the largest 
coefficients. This indicates that the highest levels of immobility emerge in the lower 
and especially in the higher parts of the wage distribution. For example, an individual 
being in the second lowest decile of the wage distribution in year t is almost 20 times 
more likely to remain in the same decile in year  1 + t  than expected under perfect 
mobility. In contrast, workers with wages in the middle part of the wage distribution 
are more likely to change their position in a one-year period. However, transitions of 
more than one decile are rather rare in the whole range of the distribution. Our results 
demonstrating that both low- and high-paid employees will almost surely retain their 
rank in the wage distribution in the subsequent year and that workers in the middle 
income classes face limited chances of improving or worsening their position are 
consistent with previous studies (Burkhauser, Holz-Eakin et al., 1997; Bigard,   24
Guillotin et al., 1998; Buchinsky, Fougere et al., 1998; Cappellari, 2000; Dickens, 
2000; Hofer and Weber, 2002).  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
The next question that has to be addressed is how much the pattern presented in Table 
7 differs across countries and whether these cross-country differences evolve with 
time and vary across personal and job characteristics. In Table 8 the estimates for the 
OD
od b  coefficients obtained with Model 4 are presented. Each of the coefficients that 
was not a priori fixed to zero takes on a negative value; therefore these coefficients 
denote the tendency towards more mobility. This implies that a positive 
G
g φ  value 
corresponds to more wage mobility than average in the table concerned. The pattern 
of the estimates for 
OD
od b  shows that differences across subgroups (countries, time 
points, education and sector groups) are largest with respect to the mobility in the 
higher (-32.14) than in the lower (-6.38) wage deciles.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
The 414 
G
g φ  coefficients obtained with Model 4 describe the differences across 
countries, time points, education groups, and sectors of employment. However, the 
interpretation of all 
G
g φ  coefficients is still unfeasible due to their large number. 
Therefore, 
G
g φ  coefficients were subjected to a further analysis in order to discern 
which of the main and interaction effects included among them, are worth to be 
thoroughly scrutinised and interpreted. More precisely, an analysis of variance   25
(ANOVA) was performed, the results of which are reported in Table 9. The first result 
is that the higher-order interaction terms are of little importance as the model with 
main effects and two-way interaction effects explain 77.6% of the variance in the 
G
g φ  
terms. Secondly, country is by far the most important factor in the explanation of 
mobility differences across tables (its main effect accounts for 51.3% of the total 
variance). This might be an important result as it shows that it is not so much the 
common trends and structural factors explaining the dissimilarities in wage mobility 
but foremost the particular country characteristics indicating the relevance of 
institutional, socio-economic (education, demography, employment structure) and 
also cultural explanations.  Moreover, we find that differences between the mobility 
patterns in the public and private sector are important determinants of the observed 
variance (5.3%). Although the time effect is not significant, the country-time 
interaction component is and it explains about 8.7% of the variation. Similar are the 
findings for education; even though no direct education effects are found, the country 
– education interaction effect explains a significant part of the overall variance (4.6%) 
indicating that differences in the education systems across countries constitute part of 
the explanation. This might resemble the impact of the knowledge economy and the 
positive effects investments in higher education exert on levels of wage mobility and 
therefore on economic performance. Also sector and the country-sector interaction 
explain a noticeable part of the variance. Again this might point to the significant 
impact the employment structure might exert on the wage mobility patterns.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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Figure 1 depicts the mean value of 
G
g φ  per country in the first and in the last 
time point. As can be observed, there is no clear pattern that could associate cross-
country differences with welfare state regimes. The hypothesis that in less regulated 
countries individuals experience higher levels of wage mobility is confirmed in the 
case of Ireland but has to be rejected in the case of the prototype lowly regulated 
country in Europe, the UK, where wage mobility seems to be much lower than 
expected and also lower than in most other EU countries. This is probably due to the 
fact that the Irish economy experienced a major boost during the 1990s. The 
difference in economic performance between Ireland and the UK is clearly depicted in 
table 3. In most southern European countries, which – according to the OECD’s EPL 
index – have a rather high level of employment protection, wage mobility seems to be 
higher than we predicted. Given their segmented labour market, this might point to a 
high level of in-firm wage mobility in these countries. However, Portugal, exhibits the 
lowest level of wage mobility of all European countries. Except for Portugal and the 
UK, low levels of wage mobility are found for France and Finland, which are 
classified as belonging to the strongly regulated continental regimes or, as Finland, to 
the rather flexible Nordic countries. Finland therefore seems not to fit particularly 
well in this Nordic picture, probably due to a much less flexible labour market than its 
peers in this cluster and due to its underperforming economy during this period. The 
picture for Denmark, as being part of the Nordic cluster with one of the highest levels 
of wage mobility, confirms our prior conjectures with respect to this regime. This 
might be explained by the fact that the Danish labour market seems to be particularly 
successful in combining high levels of flexibility, while safeguarding simultaneously 
appropriate levels of income and work or employment security through active and 
activating labour market policy programmes (OECD, 2004). The strongly regulated   27
regimes of Austria and Germany seem to position themselves somewhere in the 
middle of the league table of countries according to the level of regulation and the 
balance of flexibility and income and work security that they were able to attain. A 
similar position is taken by the Netherlands that we classified as also belonging to the 
Nordic cluster, with medium levels of regulation and a fairly favourable balance 
between wage flexibility and income and work security.. 
In Figure 1, it can be seen that the ranking of countries with respect to the 
levels of wage mobility varies during the observation period. In the strongly regulated 
countries wage mobility decreases (steeply in Germany and Austria), whereas in the 
Nordic countries, with the exception of Finland, that exhibit a better record in 
balancing mobility and income security goals, a significant increase in the levels of 
wage mobility can be observed. What we might learn from this is that the better 
countries are capable of creating a flexible labour market with safeguarding 
appropriate levels of income and work security (income stability) the better their 
economic and employment record tends to be. Further to this, it appears that the more 
regulated the labour market is, as the results for the Southern European countries, with 
the exception of Spain show, the more likely it is to suffer from a lower wage mobility 
growth, or even worse to be confronted with steeply declining mobility rates. In lowly 
regulated regimes of the UK and Ireland, on the other hand, there is yet no clear and 
strong pattern, as in Ireland we observe a decrease in wage mobility whereas in the 
UK an increase took place but starting from rather low levels of mobility.  
 
[Insert Figures 2 about here] 
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As Figure 2 illustrates, the estimates for the sector of employment confirm our 
prior expectations: Individuals working in the private sector experience higher levels 
of wage mobility than individuals working in the shielded public sector. Moreover, 
these differences increase during the observation period. However, comparing the 
sector effects across countries, some unexpected outcomes emerge: although wage 
mobility is lower in the public sector than in the private sector in most countries, this 
is not the case for Ireland, which belongs to the lowly regulated (liberal) cluster. 
Though we expect high rates of wage mobility in particularly the private but also the 
public sector in the UK, we observe markedly less mobility in the public than in the 
private sector. For the southern European countries our conjectures are confirmed, as 
the public sector exhibits much more immobility than the private sector. In the highly 
regulated continental and rather flexible Nordic cluster the levels of wage mobility in 
the private sector always exceeds the levels in the public sector.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that the impact of education levels differs across 
countries. Highly skilled employees exhibit more wage mobility than their less 
educated peers in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, the UK and Greece. In 
contrast, lower levels of education qualifications are associated with more wage 
mobility in Austria, Italy, Spain and especially in Denmark. No clear pattern is found 
in Ireland and Portugal. These results indicate that we have to be cautious to draw far 
reaching conclusions on the basis only of these partial analyses, as levels of education 
are not very well measured in surveys and are very difficult to compare due to the 
extremely large variation in education systems.    29
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
Educational effects, however, do not only vary across countries but also 
between sectors of employment. Figure 4 suggests that higher education is rewarded 
in terms of more wage mobility in the public sector but not in the private.  
These macro-level analysis however tend to confirm the findings of micro-
level analyses of many other researchers showing that investments in human capital 
formation pay off in terms of raising the employment opportunities, career 
opportunities and wage prospects but seemingly, though not unconditional, also in 
terms of higher wage mobility.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
Testing for the effects of regime type macroeconomic conditions and labour market 
regulations 
The results presented above indicate that countries belonging to the same country 
cluster do not necessarily show similar mobility patterns. In order to obtain a more 
formal test as to whether the regime type variable explains differences in wage 
mobility, we performed the same ANOVA as before, but now with country replaced 
by regime type. Moreover, we added to the model four macroeconomic and 
employment protection indicators as covariates: the Labour Force Participation rate 
for men between 15-64 years old (LFP), the unemployment rate for males, the GDP 
per capita (GDPpc) and the OECD’s Employment Protection Legislation index. The 
overall explained variance rises to 64.8%; the main effects of economic welfare, 
business sector, EPL and LFP emerge to be significant corroborating the results of   30
others. We also include the interaction effects between regime type and EPL, EPL and 
time, EPL and LFP and LFP and sector. Compared to our previous findings as 
reported in Table 9, regime still seems to explain a significant part of the country 
variance indicating that the way flexibility and income and work security is balanced 
plays a role in explaining country differences even after controlling for a number of 
important macro-economic and employment indicators.  We also find that the effect 
of employment sector remained significant after controlling for these variables. 
Furthermore, the outcomes show that although the macroeconomic indicators and 
EPL on their own account are seemingly not very significant determinants of wage 
mobility, they still seem to contribute to explaining a large part of the country 
differences and particularly the evolution of these differences over time.      
The results reported in Table 10 indicate that our regime model explains a 
significant part of the cross-country variation (77.6%). If we compare a model with 
regime and the viable interaction effects with time to a similar model with regime 
replaced by country the explained variance is about 94% of the explained variance in 
the country case
7. This shows that the regime cluster classification is indeed an 
excellent candidate for explaining most of the country variance. Macroeconomic 
conditions explain apparently only a small part of the country variation but the 
findings reveal that they take over the interaction effect of country with time if that 
variable is removed from the model. For this reason and since the explained variance 
is reduced only slightly, we might safely assume that the macroeconomic conditions, 
although not particularly significant for the country variation itself, are particularly 
relevant for explaining the evolution of wage mobility differences across countries 
over time. The rising wage mobility levels, which we observed over time, coincide 
                                                  
7 Results from this ANOVA are not presented in the paper.    31
apparently with a favourable economic development in a number of European 
countries during the late 1990s.  
It turned out that the main effects of the labour force participation and 
employment protection legislation variables are insignificant whereas the relevant 
interaction effects with regime are both significant. This suggests that the labour force 
participation and employment protection legislation variables exert their effects on 
wage mobility variance across countries mainly because of its strong variation within 
the various regime types across countries.   
 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
Figure 5, shows that the ranking of welfare regimes varies across time points. The 
only expectation that is clearly confirmed is that wage mobility levels in the strongly 
regulated regimes (continental European countries) are lower than in all other 
regimes. In the southern strongly regulated regimes, wage mobility was initially high 
in the beginning of the period, in 1994-95, but decreased considerably thereafter until 
1998-1999 to rise again in the years after. In the Nordic countries, the wage mobility 
was initially quite high, up to 1996 but decreased, to catch up again strongly up to 
1999. In 1999-2000 it even ranked first with respect to the wage mobility level among 
all regimes. Individuals from the very flexible liberal welfare regime experience 
larger rates of wage mobility than individuals from the strongly regulated continental 
regimes but lower rates than the Nordic regime. It should, however, be noted that we 
should be cautious in drawing conclusions on the basis of these regime findings only, 
since our evidence also shows that there are large cross-country differences within the 
various regime types. On the other hand the outcomes elicit a common trend that   32
during the economic upturn period in the mid and late 1990s, wage mobility rates tend 
to decline unexpectedly and to recover only at the very end of the period but for two 
regime clusters only, namely the Nordic and the Southern countries. The slow wage 
mobility growth during this period might be due to the commonly rather low levels of 
flexibility and job mobility in the European labour markets.    
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we examine wage mobility patterns across countries and over time. 
We applied restricted multinomial logit regression models to investigate cross-country 
differences in relative positional wage mobility in Europe, using data from the ECHP 
for 1995-2001. The method we applied was sufficiently powerful to allow us to 
control for the full set of origin states of individuals in the year-to-year transitions. It 
also was flexible enough to impose a variety of restrictions to the association 
parameters of our model, which enabled us to interpret the covariate effects and their 
time patterns. Both properties of our approach are unique compared to the standard 
(probit) regression techniques, which we also applied and compared our results with.  
Our findings suggest that although the clustering of countries in welfare regimes 
can account for a discernible part of cross-country differences in wage mobility, 
significant variation remains within the regime clusters. Cross-country variation is 
also only partially captured by differences in the macroeconomic conditions (business 
cycle effects) and the strictness of employment protection legislation, even though 
these variables seem to exert a significant effect on wage mobility differences. 
Regimes seem to play no particularly important role here while the evidence shows 
that there tends to be a lot of variation in these macro-level variables within regime   33
type. The lesson to be learned from it is that welfare regime and these macro-level 
variables not only tell us different parts of the story on the role of economic 
conditions and institutions on wage mobility, but also that separate indicators for 
institutional variation across countries such as the one on employment protection need 
to be taken into account.  
 Many of our expectations are not confirmed. As in previous studies, we find a 
strong state dependence for the lowest and the highest strata of the wage distribution. 
A low wage earner jumping to a highly paid managerial job, or a firm manager with a 
very high wage degraded to a minimum wage worker is a rather unlikely event. No 
deviation from this rule is observed in the liberal countries (especially in the UK). In 
the liberal regime, where the labour market is flexible and institutional constraints are 
absent, increased income risks do not seem to go hand-in-hand with better wage 
prospects for workers. On the contrary, we find that more flexibility of wages emerges 
unexpectedly in the Nordic countries (Denmark leading). When the strictness of 
employment protection legislation is high, as it is in Southern countries, we expect 
low levels of wage mobility but that appears not necessarily to be the case. Southern 
European countries (with the notable exception of Portugal) rank first with respect to 
their level of wage mobility in most time points. We might assume that a low level of 
wage mobility on the external labour market might be counterbalanced by a high level 
of in-firm or in-job wage mobility. Another hypothesis that might be put forward here 
involves the typical employment structure of the Southern regime with more self-
employment and a large informal sector that might also exert a similar up-levelling 
effect on wage mobility. An important finding is that our conjectures with respect to 
the strictly regulated countries are largely accepted as the strongly regulated labour 
market ensures high levels of wage immobility to workers.     34
Our findings are in accordance with our predictions when investigating wage 
mobility among certain population subgroups. The public sector is found to be a safe 
resort for risk-averse individuals, as wage fluctuations are in this sector much 
smoother than in the private sector.  
This paper had the intention to render an improved insight into cross-country 
differences in wage mobility over time. Our particular interest went to the role of 
institutional factors and we concluded that although welfare regime in itself is an 
important concept to explain cross-country differences, it only tells part of the story 
on the role of institutional differences on wage mobility patterns in Europe. Separate 
or more detailed measures of institutional variation are needed to account for the 
cross-country variation in wage mobility. We used a rather different methodological 
approach than has been used to date, but the results partly confirmed what others 
found, and partly rendered new insights into the role of these institutional phenomena. 
We addressed the question of state dependence and heterogeneity by using transition 
matrices analysis techniques, which we called restricted multinomial regression and 
which we will elaborate in the future by enriching our set of institutional indicators.  
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Table 1 
Destination decile 
Origin 
decile 
















10 , 10 3 , 10 2 , 10 1 , 10
10 , 3 3 , 3 2 , 3 1 , 3
10 , 2 3 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 2
10 , 1 3 , 1 2 , 1 1 , 1
...
: : : :
...
...
...
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
 Table 2 
Trends in Earnings Inequality 
  Gottshalk et al (1997)  Acemoglu (2003) 
  Level  Trend 1983-90  Level  Mid ‘80s – Mid’90s 
Denmark     moderate  (+)  moderate 
Sweden  low  (+) low  Low  no change 
Finland  low  (+) moderate  Low  (-) slight 
Netherlands  low  (+) slight  Low  (-) slight 
France moderate  (+)  slight    
Germany  moderate  (+) slight  Low  (+) moderate 
Belgium     Low  (-)  slight 
Ireland high  no  change     
UK  high  (+) high  high  (+) high 
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Table 3 
Macroeconomic and institutional 
variables
 
EPL 
Mean  
(1995- 
1999) 
Mean  
annual 
change
Mean  
(1995- 
1999) 
Mean  
annual  
change 
Mean  
(1995- 
1999) 
Mean  
annual 
change
Germany  80.3  -0.03  8.3  0.2  104.2  -0.6  2.6 
Austria  80.9  -0.3  3.8  0.1  113.5  0 2.4 
France  74.8  0.3  9.9  -0.1  103.8  0.1  2.8 
Finland  77.2  0.2  12.4  -1.5  102  0.3  2.2 
Netherlands  82.3  0.6  4.3  -0.8  109.9  0.2  2.3 
Denmark  85.2  0.1  5.2  -0.4  114.6  0.1  1.8 
United  
Kingdom 
83.1  -0.2  8.3  -0.9  103  0.4  1
Ireland  78.9  0.5  9.6  -1.6  105.7  2.4  1.2 
Italy  75 0.1  8.9  0 102.6  -0.3  3.1 
Greece  74.7  0.2  6.9  0.2  65.4  0.1  3.5 
Spain  77.3  0.5  15  -1.7  81.4  0.4  3
Portugal  81.8  -0.2  5.3  -0.6  68.5  0.5  3.7 
Liberal 
Southern 
Nordic 
GDP per  
capita 
Continental 
Welfare  
state  
regime 
Country 
Labour force  
participation 
Unemployment  
rate 
 
Source: OECD 
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Table 4 
Overall transitions in the sample 
123456789 1 0 SUM
1 53.0% 23.7% 8.7% 5.0% 3.4% 2.2% 1.4% 1.3% 0.9% 0.4% 100%
2 10.2% 51.1% 21.4% 7.4% 4.0% 2.7% 1.5% 0.9% 0.5% 0.2% 100%
3 3.3% 18.1% 58.3% 0.3% 9.9% 4.8% 2.8% 1.5% 0.7% 0.3% 100%
4 1.3% 4.1% 15.4% 42.1% 22.1% 8.2% 3.8% 1.8% 0.8% 0.3% 100%
5 1.0% 2.1% 4.9% 17.0% 40.6% 21.6% 7.9% 3.1% 1.3% 0.5% 100%
6 0.6% 1.2% 2.2% 5.3% 17.4% 40.7% 21.8% 7.3% 2.8% 0.8% 100%
7 0.6% 0.7% 1.1% 2.3% 5.5% 16.9% 43.4% 21.8% 6.3% 1.4% 100%
8 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 1.1% 2.2% 5.8% 16.8% 47.9% 20.8% 3.8% 100%
9 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 1.0% 2.1% 4.3% 16.8% 58.0% 16.2% 100%
10 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 1.3% 2.5% 13.6% 80.4% 100%
Destination decile
Origin 
decile
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1 234 56789 1 0 1234 56789 1 0 S U M
1 44.3% 27.5% 11.1% 6.7% 4.2% 1.9% 1.5% 1.4% 0.9% 0.6% 1 56.4% 22.6% 7.6% 4.1% 2.6% 2.5% 1.6% 1.3% 0.9% 0.4% 100%
2 10.7% 46.9% 21.5% 7.9% 4.4% 3.7% 2.5% 1.3% 0.6% 0.5% 2 8.4% 55.9% 21.9% 6.8% 3.1% 1.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 100%
3 3.0% 14.9% 44.4% 21.1% 7.9% 3.7% 2.5% 1.6% 0.6% 0.4% 3 1.9% 13.0% 50.3% 22.9% 6.0% 2.8% 1.8% 0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 100%
4 1.8% 5.1% 13.9% 43.0% 21.3% 7.4% 3.8% 2.0% 1.1% 0.5% 4 1.2% 3.2% 14.6% 45.3% 23.4% 7.5% 2.9% 1.1% 0.6% 0.1% 100%
5 1.5% 2.7% 4.9% 14.4% 40.5% 22.7% 8.2% 3.1% 1.2% 0.7% 5 0.6% 1.5% 3.5% 16.2% 44.0% 23.0% 7.2% 2.6% 1.1% 0.2% 100%
6 0.6% 1.5% 2.4% 5.1% 16.8% 40.3% 22.0% 6.8% 3.3% 1.2% 6 0.6% 0.7% 1.4% 4.7% 16.0% 44.9% 22.7% 7.0% 1.7% 0.3% 100%
7 1.0% 1.0% 1.4% 2.4% 5.2% 15.9% 42.3% 22.6% 6.4% 1.8% 7 0.6% 0.6% 0.8% 1.6% 4.8% 17.0% 45.0% 23.4% 5.3% 0.8% 100%
8 0.4% 0.6% 0.9% 1.8% 2.5% 6.0% 17.0% 45.5% 21.8% 3.5% 8 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.8% 1.6% 5.5% 15.0% 52.4% 21.5% 2.3% 100%
9 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.7% 1.3% 2.6% 4.1% 16.4% 56.8% 17.2% 9 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 1.4% 3.4% 16.9% 61.6% 15.0% 100%
10 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 1.4% 2.5% 13.1% 80.0% 10 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.8% 1.3% 12.1% 84.6% 100%
1 234 56789 1 0 1234 56789 1 0 S U M
1 56.4% 22.6% 7.6% 4.1% 2.6% 2.5% 1.6% 1.3% 0.9% 0.4% 1 54.0% 21.7% 8.7% 5.2% 3.9% 2.4% 1.6% 1.4% 0.8% 0.3% 100%
2 8.4% 55.9% 21.9% 6.8% 3.1% 1.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 2 12.1% 47.9% 20.7% 8.3% 4.5% 3.0% 1.5% 1.1% 0.7% 0.2% 100%
3 1.9% 13.0% 50.3% 22.9% 6.0% 2.8% 1.8% 0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 3 3.3% 16.1% 39.8% 21.3% 9.6% 4.9% 2.6% 1.4% 0.8% 0.3% 100%
4 1.2% 3.2% 14.6% 45.3% 23.4% 7.5% 2.9% 1.1% 0.6% 0.1% 4 1.7% 4.8% 18.2% 35.8% 21.4% 9.5% 4.5% 2.6% 1.0% 0.4% 100%
5 0.6% 1.5% 3.5% 16.2% 44.0% 23.0% 7.2% 2.6% 1.1% 0.2% 5 1.1% 2.6% 6.5% 19.5% 36.6% 19.2% 8.6% 3.2% 1.8% 0.7% 100%
6 0.6% 0.7% 1.4% 4.7% 16.0% 44.9% 22.7% 7.0% 1.7% 0.3% 6 0.6% 1.5% 3.1% 6.3% 18.7% 36.5% 21.0% 7.9% 3.5% 0.9% 100%
7 0.6% 0.6% 0.8% 1.6% 4.8% 17.0% 45.0% 23.4% 5.3% 0.8% 7 0.6% 0.8% 1.3% 3.1% 6.2% 17.7% 42.2% 19.7% 6.9% 1.7% 100%
8 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.8% 1.6% 5.5% 15.0% 52.4% 21.5% 2.3% 8 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 1.2% 2.4% 6.3% 17.9% 46.0% 19.3% 4.9% 100%
9 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 1.4% 3.4% 16.9% 61.6% 15.0% 9 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 1.1% 2.6% 5.7% 17.2% 55.4% 16.1% 100%
10 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.8% 1.3% 12.1% 84.6% 10 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.9% 1.7% 3.5% 15.3% 77.4% 100%
Table 4a 
Table 4c 
Table 4b 
Table 4d
Continental
Destination decile
Origin 
decile
Southern
Destination decile
Origin 
decile
Origin 
decile
Liberal 
Destination decile Destination decile
Origin 
decile
Nordic
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Table 5 
Country 
1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000
Austria 0.201 0.225 0.186 0.183 0.174
France 0.122 0.114 0.105 0.096 0.106 0.110
Germany  0.157 0.177 0.149 0.143 0.151 0.143
Denmark 0.281 0.290 0.324 0.290 0.305 0.331
Netherlands 0.152 0.157 0.168 0.171 0.208 0.241
Finland 0.134 0.120 0.148 0.161
UK 0.152 0.133 0.131 0.152 0.161 0.149
Ireland 0.258 0.283 0.219 0.245 0.262 0.239
Italy 0.281 0.259 0.265 0.226 0.201 0.236
Greece 0.289 0.293 0.261 0.248 0.182 0.185
Spain 0.228 0.238 0.218 0.244 0.263 0.275
Portugal 0.127 0.142 0.158 0.138 0.095 0.112
Probability of changing more than 1 decile
Time
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Table 6 
                  Comparison of the models  
Restrictions on a  and b Parameters log-likelihood BIC
0 Independence 7,776 -368,598 825,482
1 Homogeneous association 7,938 -310,472 711,068
2 General no 8,368 -307,350 717,779
3 Diagonal 8,297 -309,083 712,367
4 Diagonal and 1 decile transition 8,306 -308,560 711,423
5 Diagonal and 2 deciles transition 8,314 -308,534 711,462
6 Symmetric associations 8,341 -308,517 711,734
4a Only significant interaction effects as Model 4 7,984 -308,910 708,466
MODEL
  0 d o if b
OD
od ≠ =
OD
do
OD
od
OD
od b b and d o if b = > − = 1 0
OD
do
OD
od b b =
  0 =
OD
od b
  0   = =
OD
od
OD
od b a
OD
do
OD
od
OD
od b b and d o if b = > − = 2 0
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Table 7 
Homogeneous part of the association between origin and destination deciles 
( )
OD
od a exp  
123456789 1 0
1 27,59 5,91 1,67 0,89 0,59 0,40 0,34 0,30 0,30 0,56
21 0 , 3 6 1 9 , 9 8 5 , 7 31 , 5 80 , 7 60 , 4 30 , 2 10 , 2 30 , 1 30 , 2 7
3 2,37 6,88 10,10 3,96 1,18 0,56 0,31 0,23 0,17 0,19
4 0,95 2,07 4,04 6,07 2,74 0,99 0,51 0,29 0,23 0,23
5 0,67 0,85 1,33 2,92 5,00 2,81 1,03 0,43 0,29 0,24
6 0,34 0,50 0,71 1,13 2,72 5,09 3,17 1,02 0,54 0,30
7 0,31 0,25 0,33 0,58 1,12 2,76 6,74 3,86 1,27 0,66
8 0,23 0,17 0,23 0,33 0,58 1,24 3,98 11,26 6,88 1,53
9 0,23 0,16 0,18 0,22 0,34 0,56 1,52 5,86 29,15 13,75
10 0,42 0,20 0,20 0,21 0,23 0,38 0,67 1,94 16,26 153,85
Destination decile
Origin 
decile
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Table 8 
Coefficients 
OD
od b  for the OD table 
123456789 1 0
1 - 6 , 3 8 - 7 , 8 4 00000000
2 - 7 , 8 4 - 1 6 , 8 7 - 9 , 7 1 0000000
3 0 - 9 , 7 1 - 1 4 , 7 8 - 8 , 9 6 000000
4 00 - 8 , 9 6 - 1 5 , 9 9 - 9 , 1 4 00000
5 000 - 9 , 1 4 - 1 5 , 6 8 - 1 0 , 7 5 0000
6 0000 - 1 0 , 7 5 - 1 6 , 2 2 - 8 , 1 8 000
7 00000 - 8 , 1 8 - 1 5 , 8 7 - 1 0 , 7 4 00
8 000000 - 1 0 , 7 4 - 2 2 , 3 3 - 1 4 , 8 7 0
9 0000000 - 1 4 , 8 7 - 2 7 , 7 8 - 1 9 , 4 1
10 00000000 - 1 9 , 4 1 - 3 2 , 1 4
Origin 
decile
Destination decile
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Table 9 
Analysis of Variance for the country effects 
 
Number of 
obs
= 414
R-
squared
0,776
Dependent Variable: 
EFFECT 
Root MSE = 0,028
Adj R-
squared
0,683
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob>F
Model 0,776 121 0,006 8,4 0
country 0,513 11 0,047 60,8 0
time 0,014 5 0,003 3,6 0
education 0,002 2 0,001 1,1 0,32
sector 0,053 1 0,053 69,4 0
country*education 0,046 22 0,002 2,7 0
country*time 0,087 52 0,002 2,2 0
country*sector 0,038 11 0,003 4,6 0
time*education 0,004 10 0,000 0,6 0,84
tim e*sector 0,002 5 0,000 0,6 0,71
education*sector 0,006 2 0,003 3,7 0,03
Residual 0,224 292 0,001
Total 1 413 0,002
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Table 10 
Analysis of Variance for the welfare regime effects 
 
Number of 
observations 414 R-squared 0.647
Root MSE 0.031
Adjusted R-
squared 0.609
Dependent Variable: 
EFFECT 
Partial SS  df
Mean 
Square
F Significance
Model 0.647 40 0.02 17.1 0
Regime 0.070 3 0.02 24.7 0
Sector 0.009 1 0.01 9.2 0
EPL 0.001 1 0.00 0.9 0.36
LFP 0.001 1 0.00 1.1 0.30
Unemployment 0.000 1 0.00 0.1 0.79
Regime*time 0.017 20 0.00 0.9 0.60
Regime*EPL 0.008 3 0.00 2.9 0.04
Regime*LFP 0.136 3 0.05 47.9 0
Sector*unemployment 0.002 1 0.00 2.2 0.14
LFP*sector 0.011 1 0.01 11.2 0
EPL*time 0.010 5 0.00 2.2 0.06
Residual 0.353 373 0.00
Total 1 413 0.00
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Figure 1
The effect of countries in the first and in the last time period
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Figure 2 
The effect of sector across countries
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Figure 3 
The effect of education across countries
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Figure 4
The effect of education across sectors
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Figure 5
The effect of welfare regime across time
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